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This thesis is an analysis of the withholding of information at the hands of the federal 
government and the subsequent creation of a culture of secrecy that threatens the freedom of 
information. The primary research question was: How does the government keep information 
classified in the age of information and how does this penchant for secrecy and nondisclosure 
undermine the public’s faith in their leadership? Research into this question was conducted 
through two means: printed and online publications. The printed publications were books 
recommended to me by Dr. John Bender and the online publications were sources found through 
searches using Google Scholar and databases from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln libraries.  
My research found the culture of secrecy in the United States existed long before modern 
technology increased the speed of information sharing. When the system of classification created 
to protect the government’s secrets went beyond the public’s interests, measures were taken to 
preserve public access. Meanwhile, unauthorized leaks served to undermine the strained 
relationship between those with information and those who wanted it. The press became 
entwined in the world of secrecy early on and fought to maintain a balance between the 
government it watches over and the people it serves. These struggles have not been contained in 
the United States, but have impacted nations such as Great Britain. The power of information has 
strong implications that are revealed through this thesis as it breaks down the culture of secrecy.  
 









Implications of Information:  
An Analysis of How State Secrecy Prevails Over The Rights of Free People 
 
 Secrecy, pervasive in modern society, is the antithesis of the open government that has 
been demanded by, and seemingly presented to, the American public. Secrecy has become 
entrenched in American culture, dominating citizens’ expectations of their government and 
controlling their government’s actions in an age of mis-and disinformation where knowledge is 
power. Where secrecy was once necessary, used strictly in the interests of national security, the 
past few decades have proved that it has become pervasive and detrimental to the continued 
functioning of a nation built on freedom. 
This thesis will analyze the events of the past that (1) led to the dominating culture of 
secrecy and the system for maintaining information as it stands today, (2) break down avenues 
for access to the government’s information and how it has been shared with the public, both with 
and without proper authorization, (3) explore the role of the press in communicating between the 
government and the public it serves and (4) draw comparisons between the cultures of secrecy 
found in the United States and Great Britain, connecting international patterns in governmental 
access to information. 
At the heart of this analysis is an examination of the lack of transparency at the hands of 
the United States federal government and Great Britain’s parliamentary system of governance 
and how systems built to safeguard national secrets have created greater issues by hindering 
public knowledge of government operations and even limiting government insight into its system 
of power. As major events home and abroad have taken place over the past decades, stricter 
standards for classifying government information have been employed, pushing public 




CULTURE OF SECRECY 
Secrecy, justified as vital to keep information from the hands of America’s enemies, is being 
used to keep information from Americans, the press, Congress, government watchdog groups, 
agencies with rival agendas – anyone who threatens to question and challenge the 
administration’s policies and presumptions (Gup 50). What was once a “right to know” standard 
for obtaining information held by the government has turned into a new standard of a “need to 
know” (Gup 9). Secrecy, however, was not itself the cause of the culture that emerged to keep 
certain information under wraps. Instead, the perversion of secrecy, the rote invocation of 
classification, the habitual dependence of the United States government and its industries upon 
the art of secrecy and a general aversion to accountability by those in power led to the 
normalization of secrecy (ibid.). 
 The urge by those in power to keep information hidden, down to the minute detail, led to 
the prevailing attitude of “When in doubt, classify.” This mindset of keeping government 
information from the eyes of the public and members of Congress led to secrecy labels being 
applied to seemingly innocent data. The amount of peanut butter consumed by members of the 
armed forces was once classified as secret as the government feared the revelation of such 
information would enable enemies to determine the preparedness of the United States military 
(Jones and Lemov). 
 The reasons for strict confidentiality within the ranks of government are various, though 
military secrecy in times of war has been cited often, and diplomatic communications have been 
commonly restricted (Henkin 275). But even along with defense security in times of peace, these 
restrictions do not begin to explain all the information that the United States government has 
regularly withheld from the general public (ibid). According to Henkin, confidentiality and 
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privilege have been recognized as being essential to many working relationships, including those 
involving the United States government, and that many believe that government would become 
impossible if all communications became public knowledge. 
 Once a system of secrecy took hold, it effectively prevented the government from 
accurately assessing and dealing with its enemies (Moynihan 80). As the early twentieth century 
saw the United States enter World War I, secrets and conspiracy quickly became instruments of 
statecraft. Much of the structure of secrecy known in the United States was formed in a matter of 
11 weeks in 1917 as the Espionage Act was debated and then signed into law on June 15 
(Moynihan 84). The Espionage Act did not refer to “classified” information but prohibited the 
disclosure of certain information that was connected or related to the national defense. It 
ultimately presented statutory and constitutional uncertainty (Bellia). 
 Despite the efforts of President Woodrow Wilson, the Espionage Act did not contain a 
censorship provision. It did, however, contain two provisions that covered unlawful obtaining of 
national defense information and unlawful disclosure of such information to a foreign 
government or its agents, with more severe penalties assigned to the latter, which were harsher in 
times of war (Moynihan 96). Wilson was ultimately dissatisfied with the Espionage Act and its 
lack of a censorship provision. Wilson’s dissatisfaction led to the passing of new provisions, 
collectively known as the Sedition Act of 1918. The act defined eight specific offenses, making 
it a crime to “utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language 
about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States.” 
Congress, concerned that the act was too strenuous, repealed the Sedition Act in 1921, on 
Wilson’s last day in office (Moynihan 97). 
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 Government secrecy grew during World War II with the dramatic growth of the federal 
government and the wartime need for a high degree of secrecy – namely regarding military-
security information. After the war ended, though the military's need to guard and control 
information declined, secrecy and censorship continued, limiting the flow of government 
information to the public (Jones and Lemov). The Second World War also saw what may have 
been the first instance of the Executive Branch using the power of secrecy for its own purposes 
by “leaking” confidential government information to the press. On December 4, 1941, the 
Chicago Tribune revealed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s plans for fighting the war. What 
appeared to be the unauthorized release of information actually may have been an example of the 
government rationing secret information in order to affect third parties (Moynihan 133). 
 The start of the Cold War saw secrecy expand, reach significantly beyond military 
information, and become institutionalized as a part of the bureaucracy in the United States 
(Aftergood). In September 1951, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 10290, 
establishing for the first time a classification system that was able to encompass both civilian and 
military agencies. The order also authorized any Executive Branch agency to classify 
information and defined a vague standard for classified information as “official information the 
safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security” (Aftergood 84). 
The United States had a good reason to fear for its national security in the form of 
classified information. World War II saw the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii as an external 
threat to the United States. With the Cold War, however, Soviet spies invaded the nation’s 
system of information as internal threats (Moynihan 142). Secrecy became the norm during the 
years of the Cold War, as a culture of bureaucracy will tend to foster a culture of secrecy (153). 
Even after the Cold War ended, secrecy as a mode of governance continued (202). The Cold War 
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gave the United States a vast secrecy system that shows no signs of receding and has since 
become a characteristic mode of governance in the United States Executive Branch. Intelligence 
agencies and budgets have grown as the military has subsided (Moynihan 214). 
The pervasive nature of secrecy that developed during the World Wars and the Cold War 
left a lasting impact on the structure and functionality of the United States government that has 
carried through to modern times. Today, government departments and agencies hoard 
information and have thus turned the government into a market where secrets have become 
organizational assets, used bargaining chips to be exchanged for other assets (Moynihan 73). The 
tragic consequences of this information hoarding were displayed following the events of 
September 11, 2001, when it was revealed that government agencies and departments had failed 
to share vital information (Gup 7). The perils of unrestrained secrecy have been shown time and 
again to not be abstract. It is clear excessive secrecy discredited security processes and 
undermined social values and interests such as national security, privacy, intellectual property 
rights, medical confidentiality, fair trials, diplomatic and business negotiations, and journalistic 
enterprises (Gup 9-10). 
Government has used secrecy for its advantage, often cloaking controversial acts by high-
ranking officials. It is believed by some that greater coordination and fewer restrictions on 
secrets could have led to the September 11 attacks being uncovered and even foiled. The threat 
of weapons of mass destruction and the government’s justification for invading Iraq are 
testaments to the abuse of secrecy employed by those with the highest authority as they keep the 
truth wrapped in classification (Gup 7). Additionally, most critical national policies, whether 
they concern issues of national security, are the products of secret government meetings. The 
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information presented is denied to the press, citizens and even Congress and yet is upheld by the 
courts (7).  
Within its pervasive nature, secrecy at the governmental level has also presented strong 
instances of irony. At times, while employed in the interest of national security, secrecy has 
ultimately resulted in that security being put in harm’s way. Despite unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information and programs since September 11, military and intelligence sources have 
been unable to demonstrate any instance where national security has been strongly damaged due 
to the release of information (Priest and Arkin, xx). On the contrary, by allowing the government 
to operate in the dark, much harm has been inflicted on the United States and its counterterrorism 
efforts, its economy, and its strategic goals (xx). While serving as the director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, George Tenet kept his mouth shut when it came to the nation’s secrets and 
classified topics. Upon his retirement, however, he profited from speeches that revealed this 
same information and made four million dollars on a “tell-all” book deal years after the events he 
detailed had come and gone (Gup 65). 
Information is withheld from the public ostensibly because it is perceived that its 
disclosure would damage national security. Meanwhile, files under classification consistently 
contain records of policy decisions, historical and budget documents and environmental data - 
information that could in no way compromise the safety of the nation (Aftergood). While the 
government’s realm of secrecy extends far beyond the measures needed for reasonable protection 
of national security, the full scope of the government’s classification system cannot even be 
determined as that information itself is classified (Aftergood).  
The Executive Branch plays a crucial role in the transparency of the nation’s government 
and its willingness to reveal otherwise secret information to the general public. With each acting 
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president and his administration, the expectation for the sharing of information is altered. Under 
George W. Bush from 2000 to 2008, the United States experienced eight years of secret 
decisions, classified memos and covert operations by the president (Priest and Arkin 55). In 
February 2006, the Justice Department found itself resisting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 
demands to turn over legal memoranda that were said to legally justify Bush’s domestic 
surveillance program (Gup 2). Despite going forward in secrecy without warrants or recourse to 
the courts, a violation of the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
Bush insisted his secret surveillance within America was legal. Meanwhile, the legal memos to 
support his claim were labeled as classified, even to members of Congress (2).  
Many hoped to see changes under President Barack Obama when he took office after 
Bush. Despite an initial show of improvement over the Bush administration, behind the scenes 
the situation was actually much worse when it came to transparency and sharing information 
with the public (Priest and Arkin xxi). Under Obama, the Justice Department took a “more 
aggressive tack against the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by pursuing more 
so-called leak investigations than the Bush administration” (xxi). On the other hand, Obama 
declared a new day following Bush’s actions by signing off on instructions for all agencies and 
departments to “adopt a presumption in favor” of the Freedom of Information Act. He also 
issued a Presidential Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government (55). Despite his 
idealism during his early days in office, only a few of Obama’s transparency initiatives were ever 
realized. The hidden world of secrecy continued to grow behind the veil of classification.  
 
THE SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION 
The culture of secrecy in the United States flows from the system for classification put in place 
by the government to regulate the general public’s access to information. The big question to 
9 
 
come out of this system for classifying information is “why?” To put it simply, information is 
classified by the government because although there are no disincentives for classifying the 
specified material, at the same there exist considerable risks for letting sensitive information slip 
through (Gup 45). The standards for what information is classified have changed and expanded 
over the years. Information deemed secret at any level and necessary to keep from the public’s 
eye is the obvious material requiring classification. Derivative classification decisions are also 
made, meaning that if any secret is included in another document in whole or in part, the 
document that contains that secret must also be classified (35). Once information is classified, 
there are numerous government measures in place to protect it. These measures include 
nondisclosure agreements (enforced through injunctive relief) and various criminal statutes that 
are in place to prohibit government employees from disclosing certain types of classified 
information (Bellia). 
Much like the determination of classification authority, the boundaries for the 
classification of security-related information are not founded on any statutory law but instead are 
defined by executive order. This is true with the exception of nuclear weapons design 
information and related topics which are protected under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
(Aftergood). Commitment to openness peaked under President Jimmy Carter who established 
that information could not be classified unless its disclosure could cause “identifiable” damage to 
national security. Carter also mandated a program of systematic declassification reviews by 
Executive Branch agencies (Aftergood). Despite his efforts, the steps Carter took while in office 
were quickly undone by his successor, Ronald Reagan. In 1982, Reagan issued Executive Order 
12356, the basis for the modern classification system (Aftergood). The order eliminated the 
Carter-era threshold of identifiable damage and effectively put an end to systematic 
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declassification review, instead only allowing the National Archives to conduct such reviews. 
Regan’s order made it clear that when in doubt, information is to be classified and if there are 
questions regarding the level of classification for certain information, higher levels of 
classification are to be adopted (Aftergood). 
The system of classification used by the United States government consists of three tiers: 
“Confidential,” “Secret” and “Top Secret.” This three-tier system was borrowed from British 
forces in France in 1917 by the American military. At the time, the system was: “For Official 
Use Only,” “Confidential” and “Secret” (Moynihan 111). Over the years, definitions were 
created for each level to determine what information fell within each category of classification. 
Most recently, Executive Order 13526, issued by President Barack Obama in 2009, defined the 
three levels of classification.  
● “The ‘Confidential’ tag shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of 
which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the 
original classification authority is able to identify or describe.  
● The ‘Secret’ tag shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the 
original classification authority is able to identify or describe. 
● The ‘Top Secret’ tag shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of 
which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national 
security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe” (United 
States, Executive Office of the President [Barack Obama] 707-708). 
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Top Secret is itself so wrapped in secrecy that the only time top secret work is recognized 
in public is when something goes wrong or when an unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information goes into the media (Priest and Arkin 160). 
For government information to be marked and filed under the proper classification level, 
classification authority must first be determined. According to Section 1.3 of Executive Order 
13526, the authority to classify information originally may be exercised only by 1. the President 
and the Vice President, 2. agency heads and officials designated by the President, and 3. U.S. 
Government Officials delegated this authority (United States, Executive Order of the President 
[Barack Obama] 708). 
Executive Order 12356 also issued definitions for the three increasingly stringent 
classification levels. At the time, “Confidential” could be expected to cause damage, “Secret” 
could be expected to cause “serious damage” and “Top Secret” could be expected to cause 
“exceptionally grave damage” to national security (Aftergood). To see information at any level, 
the appropriate security clearance is required, as is an identifiable “need to know.”  
Numerous issues with such classification come with an established system for classifying 
secret government information. A lack of uniformity, widely diverging standards for what 
constitutes a secret and the sheer volume of secrets kept under wraps by the government create a 
system that is undoubtedly vulnerable to mistakes, misjudgments and abuse (Gup 41). These 
issues also consistently lead to the overclassification of information. High-level government 
officials suggested that between 50% and 90% of national security information is not classified 
properly (Bellia). The government is seen as undermining its own notion of freedom by keeping 
too much information, often unnecessarily, from the public.  
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According to Bellia, part of the problem of overclassification lies in its internal structure, 
meaning that the current system that is in place to handle classification is tilted in favor of 
overclassification. It is less risky for lower-level bureaucrats to err on the side of classification 
and follow the notion of “When in doubt, classify.” While those who issue classifications on 
government information and materials are threatened with repercussions by their superiors for 
failing to protect sensitive materials, their superiors are unlikely to rescind the decisions they 
make in favor of classification (Bellia). 
The complexity and understated failings of the system have come at a cost and have led 
to more uncertainties than answers. By the time Barack Obama became president it was 
estimated by the government’s count that there was an $81 billion per year budget in place for 
national intelligence (Priest and Arkin 39). Even with billions of taxpayer dollars being poured 
into the government’s attempts to curtail the release of information to its citizens, it can be 
inferred that the United States government still does not know how to protect its sensitive data. 
The government does not know what information is unprotected, who can access the information 
and who should not, who already has and how much information has been retrieved without 
authorization (267). While issues abound with the government’s classification of information, 
there are avenues that exist to provide access to information so that the nation’s citizens are not 
left in the dark. 
 
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND GRANTING ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the United States was the first federal open 
government law enacted in the world with the exception of a Swedish law from the 18th century 
and a similar information law in Finland in 1951 (Jones and Lemov). For the first time, the 
American public was granted an avenue into uncovering the information that its own government 
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had been trying for so long to keep secret. When the FOIA was enacted in 1966 by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, it became the American public’s primary method for gathering information 
on the activities and even the agents of the state (Wagner). At the same time, the United States 
Supreme Court repeatedly identified FOIA as a crucial element in the functioning of a 
democratic government and acknowledged its primary function as a transparency tool for 
civilians (Wagner).  
 The impact of the Freedom of Information Act has been clear and steadfast, but the path 
to its enactment was a struggle. FOIA was the product of a 12-year battle by John Moss, a 
representative from California’s Third Congressional District who took office in 1953. 
Determined to be a one-term representative, Moss found himself in a second term, being 
appointed as chairman of the newly established Special Subcommittee on Government 
Information in 1955 (Jones and Lemov). Moss issued reassurances about not wanting to open 
government files and exposed national defense plans to hostiles forces. However, Moss knew 
that the government could not censor routine information and began to look for a compromise. 
The result was the Freedom of Information Act, which Moss then spent the next decade trying to 
move out of the House of Representatives. Once an identical bill was presented to both the 
House and the Senate, it was finally passed unanimously in full body on June 20, 1966, and was 
sent to the White House to face its biggest hurdle at the hands of President Johnson (Jones and 
Lemov). 
 Rep. John Moss had a good relationship with Johnson’s predecessor, John F. Kennedy, 
but Johnson did not like the idea of increased access to government information by the public 
because of his blatant distrust of the press. According to one New York Times columnist, Johnson 
was convinced that the press hated him and wanted to bring him down (Jones and Lemov). 
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Ironically, Johnson’s wife, Lady Bird, had used her family’s money to purchase a small radio 
station in Austin, Texas, in 1943 and turned it into the Texas Broadcasting Corporation, a 
multimillion-dollar radio and TV enterprise (Commire and Klezmer 975). Moss issued 
reassurances to Johnson, making it clear that he was not looking to use the FOIA to open 
government files in order to expose national secrets, such as defense plans to hostile forces. At 
the same time, Moss made it clear that he was not OK with the government’s ongoing tendency 
to censor routine information and was looking to use the act as a compromise (Jones and 
Lemov). 
 Moss knew that if FOIA made it to Johnson’s desk at the White House and the president 
opted to veto the act, he would not have enough votes in Congress to override the veto. The 
FOIA was presented to Johnson to sign on June 26, 1966, while he was staying at his Texas 
ranch. Johnson had until midnight on July fourth to sign the act into law. After intense pressure 
from the press and Congress and a last-minute recommendation from press secretary Bill 
Moyers, Johnson signed FOIA into law on July 4, 1966, opening the doors to public access to 
government information for the first time in the United States (Jones and Lemov). 
 The FOIA took effect in 1967 and established for the first time a statutory right of access 
by any person to the records of any federal agency (Hammitt et al. 7). Through the act, all 
records of agencies within the federal government must be accessible to the general public unless 
the information in question was specifically exempt from the requirement of disclosure (Hammitt 
et al. 1). At its core, the act promoted openness and while the discussion surrounding FOIA 
would inevitably lead to what information is ultimately withheld from the public, the dominant 
object of the act was disclosure, not secrecy (1). In order to be an effective source of government 
information to the press and the general public, the Freedom of Information Act not only allowed 
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for the release of previously secretive information through formal requests, but also outlined 
specific administrative procedures for the processing of such requests and provided options for 
the enforcement of the rights of access (19). 
 Despite the initial perceived success of FOIA, the act was far from perfect and underwent 
its first amendment in 1974 to close loopholes and strengthen provisions outlined in the act. 
FOIA was amended again in 1976, 1986 and 1996 to address issues and concerns regarding 
access to information. According to former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, the Freedom 
of Information Act was given the same respect as the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution for the parallels it drew to the amendment in addressing the freedom of speech and 
the freedom of the press (Scalia 15). Scalia also pointed out that any person who wished to 
request information from the government through FOIA did not require a “need to know” in 
order to have their request fulfilled. A requester did not even have to be a United States citizen to 
access information from the American government (17). Due to its prominence as binding the 
relationship among the government, the public and information, FOIA appeals, when requests 
are denied, are given priority in courts. These cases take precedence on dockets over all other 
cases and are given the earliest date possible in court after being expedited in every way, with 
some exceptions (17). 
The promise of openness and transparency into secured government information was not 
granted without numerous restrictions, making it clear that openness and transparency were 
limited. Along with the access granted by FOIA came nine exemptions that permitted 
government agencies to withhold access to the records being requested and to deny them either 
in whole or in part. These exemptions are made to be specifically exclusive and therefore must 
be narrowly construed (Hammitt et al. 5). The nine exemptions to FOIA are as follows: 
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Exemption 1: National Security Information - FOIA does not apply to matters that are 
authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and 
are in fact properly classified. 
Exemption 2: Internal Agency Rules - FOIA does not apply to matters that are related to 
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. 
Exemption 3: Information Exempted by Other Statutes - FOIA does not apply to matters 
that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. 
Exemption 4: Business Information - FOIA does not apply to matters that are trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained while privileged or 
confidential. 
Exemption 5: Inter- and Intra-Agency Memoranda - FOIA does not apply to matters that 
are memorandums or letters which would not be available to a party other than an 
agency in litigation with the agency. 
Exemption 6: Personal Privacy - FOIA does not apply to personnel and medical files and 
similar files the disclosure of which would invoke an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy 
Exemption 7: Law Enforcement Records - FOIA does not apply to records or information 
that has been compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which would 
interfere with law enforcement proceedings. 
Exemption 8: Records of Financial Institutions - FOIA does not apply to matters related 
to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared for the regulation or 
supervision of financial institutions. 
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Exemption 9: Oil Well Data - FOIA does not apply to geological or geophysical 
information and data concerning wells (Hammitt et al. 34-197). 
 With these nine exemptions embedded in FOIA, the government can place limits on what 
information can and will be released to the public. Over the years, the fifth exemption has 
received negative backlash among members of the press and public for its opaque definition of 
what information is truly exempt from disclosure and what information is withheld by the 
government without the proper justification. The b(5) exemption within FOIA has since 
notoriously become known as the “Withhold it because you want to” exemption (Jones 2014). 
 The term “withhold it because you want to” was first coined by John Podesta, special 
advisor to President Barack Obama during Sunshine Week in 2011. The term, and the exemption 
it is applied to, invokes deliberative process privilege and has been increasingly cited among 
government agencies to trigger exemptions to FOIA. Agencies are therefore authorized to 
withhold any inter-agency or intra-agency communication along with any agency-claimed draft 
from the public eye (Jones, “Next FOIA Fight”). Jones points out that when looking at the 
information that the b(5) exemption is applied to and the number of times it is utilized, it can be 
inferred that it is not always cited properly. 
 As of 2014, the United States government and its Freedom of Information Act ranked as 
the 44th-worst nation in the Global Right to Information World Wide Index (Jones). 
Accompanying the dismal ranking of the United States were egregious examples of b(5) 
exemption withholdings that were slowly being made public. One such example was a 600-page 
report produced by the United States Department of Justice that was kept a secret for four years-- 
until 2010-- that examined the secret history of American Nazi-hunting intelligence officials 
giving Nazis and other collaborators a haven in the United States following the end of World 
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War II (Lichtblau 2010). The secrecy surrounding the handling of the report posed a political 
dilemma for President Obama and his pledge to run a transparent administration. After the 
Justice Department resisted making the report public, a full, unredacted version was eventually 
obtained by the New York Times that spilled the government’s secrets regarding the matter 
(Lichtblau). 
 Another infamous attempt by the United States government to prevent access to 
information otherwise granted to the public by FOIA was the creation and consequent 
implementation of a concept that came to be known as “Glomarization.” The Glomar response to 
FOIA requests is presented as: “We can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence 
of records responsive to your request” (Wagner). While the current Executive Order on 
Classified National Security information recognizes an agency’s ability to confirm or deny the 
existence or nonexistence of requested information, unless the fact of its existence or 
nonexistence is itself classified, “Glomarization” was once a novel response (Hammitt et al. 6). 
 To be “Glomarized” means to be left in total darkness. The term “Glomarization” was 
coined after the salvage ship Glomar Explorer in 1974 when it was used in a joint operation 
involving the Central Intelligence Agency and billionaire Howard Hughes to secretly attempt to 
raise a sunken Soviet submarine carrying nuclear weapons from the seafloor out in the Pacific 
Ocean (Gup 82). Following the operation in 1975, the United States government first refused to 
confirm or deny the existence of documentation in response to a FOIA request after a reporter 
from Rolling Stone magazine sought documents relating to a suspected covert mission by the 
CIA (Becker). While the Glomar response should be used sparingly to preserve trust in the 
government, the response is appropriate when the existence or nonexistence of government 
records is itself a classified fact. In the context of national security, even if FOIA does not say so 
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directly, every appellate court that has considered the issues has agreed with the appropriateness 
of “Glomarization” when necessary for the protection of classified information as long as that 
information is not already in the public domain (Becker). When the information is already in the 
public domain, or widely disseminated among the public, applying “Glomarization” to try and 
keep that information becomes hypocritical at the hands of the government and undermines the 
government’s authority when it comes to keeping information secretive. 
 Using the various exemption methods at their disposal, American government agencies 
are able to withhold up to 60% of requested information either in whole or in part (Jones and 
Lemov). While the exemptions remain very broad and easy to apply to requests, substantial 
delays and fees are also used to deter requesters from accessing information. In 2011, the 
Department of Justice’s announcement that it had achieved a 94.5% release rate of FOIA 
requests was seen as a significant stretch compared to the agency’s annual FOIA statistics report 
(Jones 2012). The initial estimate of 94.5% did not include all FOIA requests that the DOJ had 
denied throughout the past year. Factoring in 11 reasons for denying a request, the agency’s 
release rate dropped drastically to 56.7% (Jones, “FOIA Statistics”). When not outright denying 
information requested, agencies are notorious for enacting delays, shunting FOIA requests to the 
side or outright neutering them though the imposition of fees for the cost of record searches and 
copying, even where there is a clear public interest in the information that is being sought (Gup 
57). 
The Freedom of Information Act has created a lasting impact that has stretched beyond 
the border of the United States. Since the United States passed FOIA in 1966, more than 117 
nations around the world have passed freedom of information laws or similar administrative 
regulations (Jones and Lemov). Even within the United States, Congress has refined certain 
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sections of the act through its amendments, improving access in areas where John Moss was 
forced to compromise in order to win its original passage. Governments have rarely volunteered 
to open their files to the eyes of citizens, so much of the legislation that allows for these 
information acts has been brought to fruition through the efforts of journalists, environmentalists, 
historians, anti-corruption advocates, and others who wish to see their governments held 
accountable (Jones and Lemov). 
To keep the United States government in check since the enactment of FOIA, agencies 
are required to release an annual report every year, detailing their administration of the FOIA. 
These reports contain statistics on the number of requests each agency receives and processes 
every year, how long the agency takes to respond to the requests they receive, and the outcome 
of each request. The reports serve as a window into the inner-workings of each agency, holding 
them accountable every year for the steps they take toward transparency. Below are FOIA report 
statistics from the CIA and Department of Defense from the 2010-2019 fiscal years. 
The annual FOIA reports provide statistics for the agency overall as well as each 
component within the agency. For the CIA, there is only one component within the agency. For 
the DOD, however, there are 33 components within the agency. These components include all 
the branches of the Armed Forces, the National Security Agency, the United States Strategic 
Command, and more. The following statistics reflect both agencies overall. 
FOIA Requests - Received, Processed and Pending FOIA Requests - CIA 
 Number of 
Requests Pending 
as of Start of FY 
Number of 
Requests 
Received in FY 
Number of 
Requests 
Processed in FY 
Number of Requests 
Pending as of End of 
Fiscal Year 
FY 2019 2,332 2,563 2,261 2,634 
FY 2018 1,949 2,726 2,345 2,330 
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FY 2017 1,469 2,572 1,988 2,053 
FY 2016 1,130 2,547 2,208 1,469 
FY 2015 1,034 3,618 3,181 1,471 
FY 2014 1,092 3,737 3,795 1,034 
FY 2013 1,144 4,573 4,625 1,092 
FY 2012 985 3,745 3,586 1,144 
FY 2011 880 3,269 3,164 985 
FY 2010 775 3,094 2,989 880 
 
 Trends in the CIA’s statistics for received, processed and pending requests show that the 
number of requests pending at the start and end of each fiscal year has consistently increased 
over the past decade. Meanwhile, the number of requests received and processed increased from 
2010 to 2013 and then showed a relatively consistent decline, with a slight increase in the last 
two years for the number of requests processed. The increasing number of requests pending at 
the start and end of each year indicated that the CIA is falling behind in its fulfillment of these 
FOIA requests. With the exception of 2014 and 2013, the CIA has consistently received more 
requests in a fiscal year than it has been able to process, putting them further and further behind 
in addressing each request. 
(Central Intelligence Agency Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019; Department of Defense 
Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019) 
FOIA Requests - Received, Processed and Pending FOIA Requests - DOD 
 Number of 
Requests Pending 
as of Start of FY 
Number of 
Requests 
Received in FY 
Number of 
Requests 
Processed in FY 
Number of Requests 
Pending as of End of 
Fiscal Year 
FY 2019 16,686 56,524 54,545 18,665 
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FY 2018 14,194 57,032 54,323 16,903 
FY 2017 13,467 55,198 53,760 14,905 
FY 2016 12,469 53,544 52,332 13,681 
FY 2015 11,704 57,498 56,507 12,695 
FY 2014 9,938 61,055 59,321 11,672 
FY 2013 9,527 68,014 67,679 9,862 
FY 2012 10,025 66,078 66,651 9,452 
FY 2011 11,755 74,117 75,648 10,224 
FY 2010 13,332 73,572 74,790 12,115 
 
 The Department of Defense reports indicate a similar pattern to the CIA, with a few slight 
differences between the two agencies. This table shows a steady increase in the number of 
requests pending at the start and end of each fiscal year starting with the year 2013. Prior to that, 
there was a decrease in requests pending. Also like the CIA, the DOD has, with the exception of 
2010-2012, fallen behind in its ability to process the FOIA requests that it receives, leading to an 
increased wait time for requesters and general delays in how quickly information is able to reach 
the public. 
Disposition of FOIA Requests - All Processed Requests - CIA 
 Number of Full Grants Number of Partial 
Grants/Partial Denials 
Number of Full Denials Based 
on Exemptions 
FY 2019 157 331 607 
FY 2018 129 348 888 
FY 2017 156 273 859 
FY 2016 247 218 983 
FY 2015 442 925 980 
FY 2014 470 1,006 1,317 
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FY 2013 462 1,052 1,951 
FY 2012 356 761 1,584 
FY 2011 413 890 960 
FY 2010 443 864 737 
 
 Evaluating the number of full grants, partial grants/partial denials and full denials based 
on exemptions from the CIA, there is no clear pattern of increases or decreases over the past 
decade. The most significant change to be noted here is the drop from 2015 to 2016 in the 
number of partial grants/partial denials from 925 to 218. All other numbers have fluctuated from 
year to year within reasonable parameters. 
Disposition of FOIA Requests - All Processed Requests - DOD 
 Number of Full Grants Number of Partial 
Grants/Partial Denials 
Number of Full Denials Based 
on Exemptions 
FY 2019 14,907 18,055 2,846 
FY 2018 18,571 15,801 2,652 
FY 2017 19,613 15,307 2,617 
FY 2016 18,247 14,546 2,548 
FY 2015 20,524 13,249 2,338 
FY 2014 20,888 13,577 3,267 
FY 2013 24,368 15,396 5,183 
FY 2012 25,672 15,318 3,148 
FY 2011 30,923 14,868 2,267 
FY 2010 29,491 16,133 2,260 
 
 Much like the CIA, the DOD also reported fairly consistent numbers over the past ten 
years for its number of full grants, partial grants/partial denials, and full denials based on 
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exemptions. There were two more significant changes in the statistics between two fiscal years 
that are worth taking note of here. First, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of full 
grants issued between 2018 and 2019. Meanwhile, there was a noticeable increase in the number 
of partial grants/partial denials between 2018 and 2019. 
(Central Intelligence Agency Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019; Department of Defense 
Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019) 
Disposition of FOIA Requests - Number of Times Exemptions Applied [1-5] - CIA 
 Exemption 1 Exemption 2 Exemption 3 Exemption 4 Exemption 5 
FY 2019 959 7 1,028 12 34 
FY 2018 1,179 5 1,255 9 40 
FY 2017 1,045 0 1,127 4 29 
FY 2016 1,142 1 1,201 2 25 
FY 2015 1,623 2 1,843 2 44 
FY 2014 1,974 2 2,224 9 82 
FY 2013 2,702 7 2,890 7 88 
FY 2012 2,112 0 2,208 1 110 
FY 2011 1,546 26 1,746 6 57 
FY 2010 1,105 44 1,525 5 46 
 
 Relating to the previous tables, when requests are denied in part or in full, it is due to the 
nine exemptions outlined in the Freedom of Information Act. In this table are the first five of the 
nine exemptions, as they are the most-cited exemptions seen in FOIA request denials. The five 
exemptions pertain to the following: 
Exemption 1: National Security Information 
Exemption 2: Internal Agency Rules 
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Exemption 3: Information Exempted by Other Statutes 
Exemption 4: Business Information  
Exemption 5: Inter- and Intra-Agency Memoranda  
While it is expected that the two most frequent exemptions are cited for national security 
concerns and to protect information that is already protected by other legislative statutes, it is 
also important to note the third most frequently cited exemption. The “withhold it because you 
want to” exemption, the fifth exemption of FOIA, has been questionable in the past in how it has 
been used to block the release of information sought in FOIA requests.  
Disposition of FOIA Requests - Number of Times Exemptions Applied [1-5] - DOD 
 Exemption 1 Exemption 2 Exemption 3 Exemption 4 Exemption 5 
FY 2019 1,975 242 3,710 3,414 4,188 
FY 2018 1,737 262 3,252 1,108 3,716 
FY 2017 1,432 275 3,449 989 3,706 
FY 2016 1,543 215 2,900 958 4,107 
FY 2015 1,662 236 2,398 1,140 3,486 
FY 2014 2,625 165 3,384 1,018 3,331 
FY 2013 4,594 182 6,024 1,219 2,986 
FY 2012 2,390 681 3,276 1,395 2,331 
FY 2011 1,510 2,163 2,827 1,870 1,975 
FY 2010 1,279 3,364 2,512 2,020 1,895 
 
 Though Exemption five, relating to inter- and intra-agency memoranda, is cited 
noticeably less than exemptions one and three by the CIA, it is the most-cited exemptions 
employed by the DOD to counter FOIA requests since 2014 while still being cited consistently in 
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previous years. Exemptions one, three, and four, pertaining to business information, have all 
been cited consistently at approximately the same rate over the past decade. 
(Central Intelligence Agency Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019; Department of Defense 
Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019) 
FOIA Requests - Response Time for All Processed Perfected Requests - CIA 

























FY 2019 14 20.11 <1 100 191.5 329.7 4 2,641 
FY 2018 12 32.21 1 1,317 306 368.49 4 2,555 
FY 2017 12 28.91 1 695 201.5 319.36 4 2,713 
FY 2016 30 38.72 <1 792 153 251.53 7 2,299 
FY 2015 17 39.85 4 2,449 53 116.22 <1 2,454 
FY 2014 16 32.87 <1 1,361 49 134.24 1 2,327 
FY 2013 13 35.18 1 2,411 62 186.02 1 3,055 
FY 2012 12 32 0 1,846 30 93 0 1,939 
FY 2011 10 23.95 0 1,242 32 113.76 0 3,104 
FY 2010 10 19 0 1,711 32 109 0 2,917 
 
 Outlined here are the statistics for how long it takes the CIA to respond to the requests 
that it processes in a given year. The statistics are divided between the types of requests that the 
agency processes, separating them into simple and complex requests, depending on the amount 
of detail and information that is called for in each request. Significant changes to be noted are the 
jumps in 2018 in the median number of days and the average number of days for complex 
requests before the figures lowered again in 2019. 
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FY 2019 6 26.48 <1 1,780 64 204.73 <1 3,478 
FY 2018 15.39 24.6 <1 1,780 115.54 178.42 <1 3,478 
FY 2017 9.84 16.34 <1 1,486 104.81 156.53 <1 3,678 
FY 2016 13.44 19.46 <1 1,758 99.02 158.97 <1 3,885 
FY 2015 11.91 16.58 <1 3,036 89.72 165.14 <1 3,517 
FY 2014 N/A 13 <1 1,345 N/A 97 <1 4,060 
FY 2013 N/A 10 <1 3,061 N/A 93 <1 4,585 
FY 2012 N/A 11 <1 2,939 N/A 115 <1 4,099 
FY 2011 N/A 19 <1 3,760 N/A 111 <1 4,475 
FY 2010 N/A 24 <1 2,306 N/A 127 <1 4,314 
 
 The statistics for the DOD in processing requests have been consistent as well with one 
significant drop in the median number of days for complex requests from 2018 to 2019 after a 
steady increase in the preceding years. 
(Central Intelligence Agency Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019; Department of Defense 
Annual FOIA Report 2010-2019) 
 
THE UNAUTHORIZED SHARING OF INFORMATION 
Bypassing the Freedom of Information Act and government authorization, information is 
released and circulated without such proper clearance. In the age of information, a single person 
has the power, though perhaps not the authority, to derail government policy with a single leak of 
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classified information (Gup 49). Though the government has been known to keep information 
classified that would otherwise cause no conceivable harm to the public or to national security 
through the misuse of the Freedom of Information Act and its exemptions, there is a plethora of 
information that is kept secret by the government for valid reasons. If released to citizens and, 
consequently, enemies of the United States, the state of the nation’s security could very well be 
at risk. 
 Most often, those who deal frequently in information that is vital to the national security 
of the country are not obtaining this information through secretive, illicit means, but rather 
through routine, unsuspecting channels (Moynihan 168). At one time, officials were known to 
release classified information to journalists in order to establish greater prestige, gain an 
advantage, or even to let the public become aware of information that they felt the public had a 
right to know (168). While this matter has since been quantified, it remains reasonable to believe 
that many leaks of classified information continue to come from higher reaches of power. In 
2011, Senator Benjamin Cardin from Maryland introduced a bill that made it a felony to disclose 
information to someone who does not have the proper authorization (Priest and Arkin, xxii). 
Prior to Senator Cardin’s bill, there were few major repercussions for leaking classified 
government information to the public.  
Perhaps the most notorious leak in United States history is the case of the Pentagon 
Papers in the early 1970s, which rattled the government and its ability to contain the information 
it aimed to keep secret. The Pentagon Papers were pages taken from the government report 
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense 
(Kahin). Following the end of the war, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered a study 
of the United States and its intervention in Vietnam (Moynihan, 203). The DOD’s 7,000-page 
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study contained documentation and analysis that broke down how four administrations had 
become entrapped in a war effort in Vietnam for more than two decades (204). Daniel Ellsberg, 
at the time employed by the RAND Corporation, was the leaker in question and distributed the 
study to select media outlets in the summer of 1971 (Moretti). 
The New York Times published the first set of leaked files from the Pentagon Papers on 
June 13, 1971 (Moretti). Immediately, the Nixon administration sought to halt the publication of 
the Pentagon Papers, suggesting that America’s national interests were at stake and that the 
nation would be damaged diplomatically if the publication of the documents were to continue 
(Moretti). After the second installment from the New York Times, Attorney General John 
Mitchell called for a cease to the publication of the Pentagon Papers, citing the Espionage Act of 
1917 and echoing Nixon in saying that the continued publication of the files would cause 
“irreparable injury” to the United States (Bellia). 
Realistically, the Nixon administration's attempts to suppress the Pentagon Papers were 
doomed from the start as there was no law that prohibited the publication of the documents. Such 
a law had been proposed by former President Woodrow Wilson, but Congress had ultimately 
decided against it. Wilson’s failed efforts to achieve a sweeping ban on the publication of 
defense information in espionage laws in 1917 meant a lack of recourse for Nixon (Moynihan, 
204). After the third installment by the New York Times, the Department of Justice filed suit in 
the federal district court of New York, moving for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction against continued publication. (Bellia). A temporary restraining order was granted 
against the paper, so Ellsberg moved to give portions of the leaked report to the Washington Post 
which began publishing on June 18. The Department of Justice then sought a temporary 
restraining order against the Washington Post as well. The judge refused to issue the restraining 
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order, but this decision was reversed by a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court after the Post’s second 
installment (Bellia). 
The case moved quickly to the Supreme Court and on June 30, the court ruled 6-3 in 
favor of the newspapers’ right to publish. The argument was that in the absence of explicit 
Congressional authorization, there was a lack of constitutionality for a prior restraint on the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers unless the disclosures in question would result in “immediate 
and irreparable damage to our nation or its people” (Moretti). In the end, the Pentagon Papers 
became a testament to the power of information and the rights of the press at the hands of the 
government and the information it worked to keep hidden.  
Today, the Pentagon Papers and Ellsberg’s actions have raised red flags regarding the 
information superhighway that has developed at the hands of modern technology. In 1971, 
Ellsberg spent six weeks secretly photocopying the thousands of documents contained in the 
report while in 2002, former treasury secretary Paul O’Neill walked out of his office with more 
than 19,000 documents one CD in a single day (Gup 24). Ellsberg was far from being the last 
person to leak classified documents about United States government activities. Comparisons 
were drawn to Ellsberg and the release of portions of the Pentagon Papers 40 years later in 
2010/2011 when WikiLeaks co-founder Julian Assange used his platform to publish hundreds of 
thousands of leaked documents about the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and other diplomatic cables 
(Quinn). The Supreme Court’s decision in the Pentagon Papers case signaled that the task of 
weighing whether to publicly disclose leaked national security information would fall to 
publishers and not to executives or the courts (Bellia). Publishers under United States law began 
having to weigh the potential harms and benefits of disclosure against potential criminal 
penalties and journalistic norms.  
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Both cases posed the same institutional question: Who decides when the need for public 
access to certain leaked national security information outweighs the potential harm that 
dissemination might cause? (Bellia). Edward Snowden did little to answer this question in 2013 
when the former National Security Agency contractor deliberately leaked classified documents 
pertaining to the operations of the NSA to journalists (Moretti). As Snowden fled to Hong Kong 
and then Russia where he was granted temporary asylum, politicians branded him a traitor. One 
reporter from the British publication, the Guardian, labeled Snowden a “whistleblower” – a 
positive term. While other news organizations adopted this term, the Washington Post kept their 
terminology neutral by labeling Snowden a “source” (Moretti). 
Seven years after Snowden blew the whistle on the NSA by leaking information 
regarding the agency’s mass surveillance of Americans’ telephone records, his actions raised 
questions of morality when in 2020 a U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the surveillance program 
he exposed was illegal (Satter). Though Snowden still faces espionage charges in the United 
States, he responded to the court’s ruling on Twitter, saying that the ruling was a vindication of 
his decision to go public with the evidence of the NSA’s domestic eavesdropping operation 
(Satter). After the program was exposed, top intelligence officials fell back on their public claim 
that the NSA never knowingly collected information on Americans, instead attempting to justify 
the operation by insisting that the spying that they had conducted through the program had 
played a crucial role in fighting domestic extremism (Satter). 
The controversies in which Ellsberg, Assange and Snowden were embroiled highlighted 
increasing pressure for the leaking of information and brought into question where the 
responsibility for the publication of such information landed: with the leaker or with the press? 
The question first raised by the Pentagon Papers was whether publication by the press is different 
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and if the press had a duty to fulfill “the right of the people to know” what the government was 
up to. Aside from the press, the perceived right of the people to know was not considered 
violated if the government took it upon itself to maintain secrecy in some matters. In principle, as 
in practice, the “right of the people to know” the government’s actions always has been reduced 
by “the right - or duty, or responsibility - of the Government to withhold” for the public’s interest 
(Henkin). This has led to the role of the press being called into question as it continues to serve 
as a buffer between those who have the information and those who want it. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE PRESS 
The duty of the press has always been to bridge the gap between the government and the people, 
serving as a watchdog over the government to shine a light in dark corners and keep the public 
informed. With the increase in government secrecy, the press has unwittingly transformed into a 
carrier of that secrecy whenever the government decides to operate behind closed doors. As 
channels that were once open are filled with denials, journalists have been forced to follow less 
conventional methods of access (Gup 137). Kent Cooper, former executive director of the 
Associated Press, popularized the term “right to know” with his 1956 book by the same name 
(Jones and Lemov). The term was introduced in 1953, however, when leading newspaper lawyer 
Harold Cross published “The People’s Right to Know” and simultaneously confirmed the press’ 
fears about the systematic denial of government information. Cross asserted that the press and 
the public alike have an enforceable legal right to have access to inspect government records 
(Jones and Lemov).  
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States sought to protect the 
freedom of the press and its right to report on and to criticize the government’s actions and 
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remains one of the press’s biggest weapons in its fight to access information. With the Pentagon 
Papers, the press asserted something more: the right to publish documents that were prepared by, 
belonged to, and emanated from the Executive Branch (Henkin). There is a narrow range of 
circumstances where the government may be entitled to injunctive relief to prohibit the 
publication of national security information, namely when the publication of such information 
would carry the risk of irreparable damage to the United States (Bellia). The Supreme Court has 
invalidated state attempts to impose civil or criminal penalties on the publication of information 
that is both lawfully obtained and truthful over assertions that penalties were necessary to 
safeguard certain state interests (Bellia). 
To date, United States v. Progressive remains the sole instance where a court granted 
injunctive relief that prohibited publication based on the claim that disclosure was a threat to 
national security. The injunction against Progressive magazine prevented it from publishing 
certain technical information regarding the construction of thermonuclear weapons (Bellia). 
Later, however, the government dropped its objection to the publication and the Progressive was 
able to publish its article on thermonuclear weapons. A possible benchmark to ascertain what 
information should be restrained from publication is the “clear and present danger” test. This 
test, to a degree, addresses questions of scope, immediacy, and proximity that the Pentagon 
Papers case first raised. The threat of criminal penalties may also have some deterrent effect 
against the publication of leaked information, but they can only be used against entities that are 
within the realm of United States enforcement jurisdiction (Bellia). 
Prior restraints are a source of contention in the relationship between the government’s 
laws and the press when the perceived right of the press to publish certain information is called 
into debate. The question to be asked here is: Can the courts ever block the press from publishing 
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truthful information that is of interest and value to the public? When a temporary restraining 
order was granted against the New York Times in the case of the Pentagon Papers, the premise 
was that a court could, at times, lawfully enjoin the publication of information if they could 
claim that the information in question would threaten national security. On the other hand, this 
same premise was rejected just a few days later when the Washington Post was facing the same 
scrutiny for publishing the information that Daniel Ellsberg had leaked. The premise was 
rejected on the ground that criminal sanctions are the government’s sole remedy against the 
publication of such information (Bellia).  
The Supreme Court relied on the 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota where the Supreme 
Court had invalidated as an unlawful prior restraint an injunction that prohibited the publication 
of a newspaper that was alleged to be “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory” under 
Minnesota’s public nuisance law (Bellia). The court’s reasoning was that the prior restraint had 
violated the publication’s right to freedom of the press under the First Amendment. In the case of 
the Pentagon Papers, neither the New York Times nor the Washington Post pushed for a First 
Amendment argument that would forbid all prior restraints. Both publications agreed that the 
courts could enjoin the publication of harmful national security information, but only in narrow 
circumstances. They then argued that those specific circumstances had not been presented in 
their cases (Bellia). 
Government suppression of the press and its commitment to the expansion of the sharing 
of information has not been limited to the use of prior restraints and violations of the First 
Amendment. The numbers, resources, and laws that exist and can be presented as evidence point 
in favor of the government being able to withhold information (Gup 137). Attempts by the press 
to counter this imbalance with revelations of information are met with resistance and even 
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intimidation. Instances exist of papers not running stories for fear of being subpoenaed to reveal 
sources and the consequent threat of possible jail time if they continue (Gup 170). By refusing to 
reveal anonymous sources, journalists might also face contempt-of-court charges, fines for 
refusing to reveal and mandates to appear before grand juries. For years, false accusations of 
damage done to the country’s national security have been aimed at the press by both the 
Pentagon and the White House (160). 
Despite the scrutiny and pressure imposed by the government, the press is viewed 
differently by the courts. Publication by the press, even of government documents, cannot be 
enjoined by the courts unless the courts “balance” in favor of the government. More often, 
however, the balance perceived by the courts leans heavily toward the side of the press and of 
freedom (Henkin). At the heart of this three-way tension among the government, courts, and 
press is one fundamental question: can the courts justifiably weigh the government’s “need” to 
conceal with the press’s “need” to publish with the people’s “need” to know? (Henkin). The 
contention between the executive and the press comes down to the dilemma that is faced by each 
side. For the government, the penchant to classify information is based on the knowledge that the 
consequences of over-concealment are less grave than those of over-disclosure. Despite the best 
efforts of the press, there is a realm of secrecy surrounding the government that is not easily 
penetrated. But this problem, pervasive as it is, is certainly not limited to the United States. 
 
SECRECY IN GREAT BRITAIN 
In Great Britain, parallels can be drawn to the United States and balancing between the 
protection of government information and the public’s right to know. These parallels aside, 
however, the guidelines are much stricter outside of the U.S for what the public is able to know. 
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Britain’s first Official Secrets Act, originally titled the “Breach of Official Trust Bill,” was 
drafted in 1888 and passed in 1889 after numerous unauthorized disclosures of information from 
government departments (Bartlett and Everett 12). The next century was not without incident. As 
leaks continued, attempts to strengthen the act were made in 1896 and 1908 but were quickly 
abandoned due to public criticism (Griffith 273). New versions of the act were drafted in 1911, 
1920, 1939, and most recently in 1989, each one replacing its predecessor. The Official Secrets 
Act outlines six categories that it protects: security and intelligence, defense, international 
relations, law and order, information about or obtained by activities under warrants issued under 
the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and the Security Service Act 1989, and foreign 
confidences (279).  
 Many of the offenses that are described in the act arise when a “damaging discourse” is 
made. Creators of the act sought to replace this descriptor in the 1989 revision with greater 
specifics. The new standard became “a disclosure which would cause serious injury to the 
interests of the nation” (283). The first major defect in the act, from a freedom of information 
standpoint, was that the bill created absolute defenses where no “damage” to the state needed to 
be shown, enabling a blanket of perpetual confidentiality over all degrees of disclosures: serious, 
trivial, urgent, outdated and by members of the security and intelligence services alike (287). The 
act also failed to adequately represent the relationship between constitutional and representative 
government and freedom of the press as this relationship was being evaluated in two contrasting 
ways. The first saw the freedom of the press as the strongest existing force in the promotion of 
political democracy and the continued freedom of the press as essential to the preservation and 
expansion of that democracy. The other saw the freedom of the press as a sort of privilege that 
was made possible only in and because of the government (287). 
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 Years after the Official Secrets Act came the Investigatory Powers Act and the 
government’s justification for discovering the secrets of its subjects. Passed in 2016, the act 
quickly became known as the “Snooper’s Charter” as it gave British intelligence agencies and 
police the most sweeping surveillance powers in the western world (MacAskill). After being met 
with only a token of resistance from inside parliament over the course of 12 months and hardly 
any resistance from outside, the act legalized a range of tools for snooping and hacking by 
security services that were unmatched by any other country in western Europe or even the United 
States. The act was passed so smoothly that the government did not have to make a single 
substantial concession to the privacy lobby in order to get it passed (MacAskill).  
 Most alarming in the passing of the Investigatory Powers Act was the fact that it simply 
legalizes powers that the security agencies and police had been using for years without making 
this information clear to either the public or to parliament. On the journalistic side, the legislation 
fails to provide acceptable protection for journalists’ sources who wish to remain anonymous, 
effectively deterring ethical checks and balances found in whistleblowing (MacAskill). Though 
the act made it a requirement for judges to sign off on police requests to view journalists’ calls 
and web records, the new law was still viewed as “a death sentence for investigative journalism” 
(Travis). While a positive element of the act was that it, for the first time, clearly set out the 
surveillance powers that are available to the intelligence services and police, privacy advocates 
argued that giving the act royal assent to become law would set a new international standard to 
authoritarian regimes to justify their own surveillance powers (Travis). 
The passing of the Investigatory Powers Act into law raised concerns worldwide, even 
drawing the criticism of notorious NSA leaker Edward Snowden. At the time Snowden revealed 
the scale of mass surveillance being conducted by the NSA in the United States, he 
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simultaneously revealed similar information implicating Britain’s Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), as the two agencies are known to work in tandem (MacAskill). The first 
and most explosive of Snowden’s revelations was published by the British publication, the 
Guardian in 2013 (Satter). While the leaked information was considered damaging to national 
security in the United States, it was not considered as such in Britain due to the nation’s more 
liberal approach to how the government is able to conduct its official business. Still, the 
revelations generated a great deal of political embarrassment which led to the British government 
becoming noticeably hostile toward the Guardian. The government’s hostility was expected, 
given the circumstances, but joining them in calls for the publication to be prosecuted were 
British papers the Sun, Mail, and Telegraph (Petley). The Guardian has traditionally held great 
power as a key provider of investigative reporting and has been recognized by Britain, the United 
States and Australia for its work (Carson and Farhall 1903). The success of the Guardian and its 
investigative powers has not gone unnoticed among British media, leading to these acts of 
hostility. 
During this period, British newspapers had collectively complained about what they 
perceived to be “statutory control” of the press. Given these circumstances, Britain’s papers may 
have been expected to come to the defense of the Guardian following the publication of 
Snowden’s revelations. Instead, the Mail, Sun and Telegraph, along with the weekly publication 
Spectator, did everything they could to bolster the government’s case by working to undermine 
the Guardian’s case (Petley). Other papers that did not participate in this attack contributed by 
underplaying the impact of the revelations made by Snowden as well as the impudence of the 
government against the Guardian. The Guardian has been no stranger to faux libel charges and 
has been fearlessly defending itself for years. In 1995, the publication fought and won libel 
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action brought by former Minister for Defence Procurement Jonathan Aitken after the Guardian 
reported a Saudi Arabian businessman had paid for Aitken’s stay at the Paris Ritz hotel in 1993 - 
a breach of ministerial rules (Donnelly). The Guardian covered the story when other newspapers 
did not, setting itself apart with its investigative efforts to uncover hidden stories. The British 
national press, specifically the mainstream broadsheets and respectable tabloids, is considered a 
key part of the Establishment, not a watchdog over the government and its actions (Petley). The 
acknowledged role of the press in relation to the British government produces a lack of surprise 
when the government and security services declare that particular journalistic activity endangers 
“national security” or damages “national interest.” Newspapers, in these instances, often act 
accordingly, though they accept the judgement with reluctance (Petley). 
 The dissension amongst the British publications was not inherently a question of 
freedom, but rather a matter of national security. For the Sun and the Mail it was undeniable that 
Snowden’s revelations via the Guardian had caused irreversible damage to the state of Great 
Britain's national security. It is no surprise that no other publications offered resistance to the 
government’s appraisal of the situation. In many British publications, dissenting sources are 
rarely quoted and pronouncements by government officials are most often taken at face value 
(Petley). The airing of “Parliamentary Questions” has given the British public insight into their 
government and officials’ stances on debated issues. The instrument of parliamentary questions 
serves as a check on ministers, Commissioners, and other officials in power by allowing 
Members of Parliament the opportunity to ask questions of the executive (Proksch and Slapin).  
National security in Britain is ultimately defined by whatever the papers say it is. There is 
a different ethos in the British press than in the American press when it comes to how pertinent 
information is obtained for publication. A 2014 survey found that slightly more than half of U.K. 
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journalists are okay with occasionally paying for information, a practice known as checkbook 
journalism (Smith). Like other products, information is treated as a commodity to be traded in 
the marketplace. State secrecy in Britain is viewed as a form of censorship and rests on the 
assumption that “there is a wide difference between what is interesting to the public and what is 
in the public interest to make known” (Griffith 289). It appears, with some exceptions, that there 
is a reluctance among those with authority in the press to push through and claim the freedoms 
that have been trusted to them. 
It is imperative to understand the differing reactions of the United States and Great 
Britain in response to Snowden’s leaked information. While Americans were generally shocked 
by the revelations regarding the NSA, Britons were relatively unmoved. The stark difference 
illustrates in great detail how each nation approaches the relationship between the government 
and its people, the role of the press aside. Many Americans claim that the government is meant 
to work for them and they demand transparency, but what they have come to accept often looks 
quite different. Governments are supposed to fear their people, but survey results have found that 
the reverse is true in the United States. According to Chapman University’s annual Survey of 
American Fears in 2018, 73.6% of Americans fear corruption in government, more than any 
other fear on the list and showing a 13% increase from 2016 (Ponsi). With this fear, Americans 
accept the lack of transparency and culture of lying that they are presented with by their so-called 
open government as journalists find themselves stuck in the void of misinformation.  
Snowden’s actions led to an exposure of an arm of the government that was acting 
without the permission and/or knowledge of the American people and the members of Congress 
(Petley). On the contrary, British subjects with their parliamentary, not popular sovereignty, tend 
to accept that power flows from the top down. This approach, however, doesn’t limit the press or 
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its penchant for disclosing government activity to the people. The Profumo affair, which exposed 
former Secretary of State for War John Profumo’s affair with a 19-year-old model, was broken to 
the public via the press. The story of Profumo’s affair in 1963 opened the door for talking 
publicly about sex and set the stage for the coverage of future scandals (Kettle). The contrast 
between the United States and Britain and the media coverage their people expect is a key 
indicator in highlighting what is deemed acceptable by each nation. 
 On January 4, 2021, Judge Vanessa Baraitser ruled against the extradition of WikiLeaks 
co-founder and accused leaker Julian Assange to the United States to face charges (Quinn). 
Judge Baraitser rejected arguments that Assange would not get a fair trial in the United States but 
blocked the extradition on the basis that procedures in American prisons would not prevent 
Assange from taking his own life if he were to be returned to the United States (Quinn). Baraitser 
noted that Assange’s mental health would become worse under the prison conditions he would 
surely face in the United States and his extradition would be oppressive. British law states that 
when a person’s mental or physical health makes extradition unjust or “oppressive,” the judge is 
required to order the person’s discharge (Macfarlane). The state of Assange’s mental health 
means that he cannot be extradited to face charges of espionage and of hacking government 
computers for his role in the classified information revealed by WikiLeaks. 
 
A CONCLUSION ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION 
Former President Donald Trump and his compatriots denounced a lack of transparency in the 
government and it propelled him into the White House. His supporters voted him into office 
because they believed his claims that the United States government was no longer accountable 
and had been making decisions without the public’s knowledge or consent (Fenster 173). In a 
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push for transparency and truth, the four years of Trump’s presidency set a record for more 
FOIA requests filed than at any other time in American history. During the Trump 
administration, the media led unprecedented efforts to uncover the truth in the wake of Trump’s 
constant spew of lies. In those four years, the media filed a total of 386 FOIA cases to federal 
court – more than all of the cases that were filed by the media during the 16 combined years of 
the Bush and Obama administrations (Fischer).  
 Despite the best efforts of a relentless media, it is undeniable that Donald Trump found 
himself in the Oval Office because millions of Americans voted to put him there, acquiescing to 
countless falsehoods and a culture of hatred under his leadership. The contemporary culture of 
lying in the United States was not necessarily introduced during Trump’s presidency, but it was 
certainly normalized. The country as a whole became far too comfortable with not knowing what 
was true and what was not. The media fought against falsities but were met with claims of fake 
news and the perception that the press had become the “enemy of the people.” Naïvely, many 
Americans still believe that they are not okay with the system of concealment that the 
government has in place while simultaneously subscribing to the barrage of lies from those in the 
highest seats of power. They have become complacent, not hesitating to embrace the lies that are 
disguised as freedoms.  
Secrecy is, at times, legitimate and even necessary, but an established culture of secrecy 
does not need to remain the norm in American government as far as the interest of national 
security is concerned. Analysis, not secrecy, is the key to true security (Moynihan 221). The 
evolution of government secrecy was seen through phases and can be phased out in the same 
way that it came in. While the culture of secret information began reasonably, driven by threats 
to safety in the era of world wars, times have changed and the continued withholding of 
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information that the public has a right to know only serves to damage the relationship between 
the American people and their government. 
 In this thesis, the events of the past that led to the creation of the pervasive culture of 
secrecy have been brought to light and the current system of classification thoroughly explained, 
the points of access within the government’s iron-clad vault of secrecy have been uncovered and 
evaluated in terms of how that information is then dispersed to the public, the role of the press 
has been measured in detail to breakdown how the Fourth Estate executes its responsibilities, and 
a connection was made on a global level between the United States and Britain to establish a 
global system for withholding valuable information. Trust and transparency go hand-in-hand. 
One cannot be expected without the presence of the other. Secrecy may be used as a form of 
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